Nuclear Nonproliferation: Difference between revisions
Siterunner (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Siterunner (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
; <big><big>'''Nuclear Weapons -- Proliferation v Nonproliferation'''</big></big> | |||
[[File:Last Days in Office, Last Days to Advance Nuclear Nonproliferation.png]] | |||
<big>'''Re: the President’s Last Days as Commander-in-Chief'''</big> | |||
A key focus of GrnPolicy and Strategic Demands 'environmental security, national security' agenda -- nonproliferation, arms control, peace... | |||
StratDem update / July 10, 2016. A month ago we wrote that the president's final day in office should include exec orders addressing nuclear proliferation issues. It looks like we are getting our wish. | |||
http://strategicdemands.com/re-presidents-last-days-commander-chief/ | |||
:https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/obama-plans-major-nuclear-policy-changes-in-his-final-months/2016/07/10/fef3d5ca-4521-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc_story.html | |||
◊ | |||
<big>'''A New Nuclear Arsenal — and Reflections on a President’s Last Days in Office'''</big> | |||
'''June 19, 2016''' | |||
http://strategicdemands.com/new-nuclear-arsenal/ | |||
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ | |||
<h2>''Review of Conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms Treaty''</h2> | <h2>''Review of Conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms Treaty''</h2> | ||
'''April 2015''' | |||
'''Nonproliferation or Proliferation?''' [http://strategicdemands.com/npt-treaty-at-risk/ '''''Report from StrategicDemands.com'''''] | '''Nonproliferation or Proliferation?''' [http://strategicdemands.com/npt-treaty-at-risk/ '''''Report from StrategicDemands.com'''''] | ||
Revision as of 22:39, 15 July 2016
- Nuclear Weapons -- Proliferation v Nonproliferation
Re: the President’s Last Days as Commander-in-Chief
A key focus of GrnPolicy and Strategic Demands 'environmental security, national security' agenda -- nonproliferation, arms control, peace...
StratDem update / July 10, 2016. A month ago we wrote that the president's final day in office should include exec orders addressing nuclear proliferation issues. It looks like we are getting our wish.
http://strategicdemands.com/re-presidents-last-days-commander-chief/
◊
A New Nuclear Arsenal — and Reflections on a President’s Last Days in Office
June 19, 2016
http://strategicdemands.com/new-nuclear-arsenal/
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ
Review of Conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms Treaty
April 2015
Nonproliferation or Proliferation? Report from StrategicDemands.com
The nuclear threat environment is recharging to produce a new era. A multiple nation realignment and force modernization are producing elements of a new Cold War. Entangling alliances are developing. Next-generation nuclear weapons — ‘smarter’, more deliverable, and usable — are in development
Through May 22, 2015, the United Nations headquarters in New York is hosting the ninth five-year Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms (NPT).
The occasion demands a strategic review of the current state of nuclear weapons, the status of nuclear agreements, the future of nuclear weapons development and deployment. The risks of catastrophic nuclear war, the use of nuclear weapons in a strategic or tactical exchange, remain all-too-real. The de-escalation of Cold War US-Soviet Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) policies, and accompanying series of nuclear weapons disarmament, control and monitoring agreements, is giving way to re-escalation.
A new era of ‘smart’ nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons modernization policies are carried-forward within a framework of “instant alert”, “fire on-warning” policies of the Cold War. The mix of billions in planned new nuclear spending and development will deliver a new and potentially more deadly nuclear order.
The entry of China as a major nuclear weapon player developing its own ‘triad’ of nuclear delivery systems, the mutual defense relations being pursued between nuclear weapon nations, the race to modernize and react to other nations nuclear modernization including Russia, China, India and Pakistan. The latest nuclear arsenal questions regarding North Korea bring warnings of an “arsenal” and Israel and Iran tensions in the Mideast continue as diplomatic negotiations are railed against by US political opponents. All this must give pause to any rationale discourse of security being a function of nuclear weapons modernization and proliferation.
The paucity of discussion/debate and even awareness of what is being funded, what is in the pipeline of many countries is another warning of a nuclear threat environment that is re-casting Cold War risks of flash point, mistakes, provocations, and nuclear exchange.
Let’s look at the RevCon meeting over the next month, beginning with an initial survey of several revealing pieces from the few sources who are tracking the increased nuclear threat.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- The Nonproliferation Barrier, No Consensus Possible
http://fpif.org/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference-cant-win-for-losing/
The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (more commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) has long been considered, along with the concept of deterrence, as the strongest bulwark we have against nuclear war. Briefly, the states that had developed nuclear weapons prior to the treaty were allowed to keep them as long as they promised (without being bound to a deadline) to work toward disarmament. Meanwhile, states without nuclear weapons were to refrain from developing them, but would be entitled to nuclear energy.
Like deterrence, the NPT’s reputation is over-rated. That said, at the UN headquarters in New York City from April 27 through May 22, the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) is being held for the ninth time since the treaty entered into force in 1975. This Review Conference marks the end of a five-year review cycle.
In a Los Alamos Study Group bulletin, Executive Director Greg Mello underscores the fundamental problem with RevCon. Any final document with commitments undertaken by the NPT Parties at this RevCon requires consensus of the Parties. This … means that the RevCon … like all eight preceding meetings over the past 40 years, will produce no binding disarmament measures.
With regards to that consensus, Mello quotes Dominique Lalanne for the Armes nucléaires STOP and the French International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. At the end of each Review Conference a document is submitted for “consensus” approval... The opposition of a single State prevents a consensus and blocks adoption of the final document.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- Nuclear Weapon Systems 'Modernization' is Underway
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-many-ways-does-the-air-force-need-to-deliver-a-nuclear-weapon/2015/04/20/c33eeb96-e5dc-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html Via the Washington Post] / by Walter Pincus
At a time of tight defense budgets, why does the Air Force plan to spend billions of extra dollars so that a president 10 or more years from now can have two options if he or she wants to use bombers to attack an enemy with nuclear weapons?
... Think about that. That future president would have the option to employ the planned, manned or perhaps unmanned long-range strike bomber (LRSB) to drop B61-12 nuclear bombs, both of which are now in development.
The proposed cost of 80 to 100 new LRSBs, at about $550 million each, could exceed $55 billion, although not all of it would be for the nuclear mission. The cost of development and production of a new B61 bomb is estimated at $10 billion, although some money would be allocated to fighter bombers attached to NATO…
Arms control treaties between Moscow and Washington brought those numbers down. But the move by both countries to modernize their nuclear-capable long-range cruise missiles and bombers actually lets them take advantage of a loophole in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty…
On April 5, 2009, in Prague, President Obama set a goal of “a world without nuclear weapons” and got great applause. But then Obama added, “I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly — perhaps not in my lifetime.”
The Senate ratified the new arms treaty on Dec. 22, 2010, but to get Republican votes for the two-thirds majority needed, Obama had to promise to modernize the American nuclear weapons complex and the nuclear delivery systems.
The treaty may have been a step forward to Obama’s goal of a weapons-free world, but the price he paid has turned out to be two steps backward.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- The Costs and Risks of Nuclear Weapon Systems Modernization
“The worldwide modernization craze scrambles the calculus of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts, challenging the aging underpinnings of the NPT itself,” writes John Mecklin for Foreign Policy. “Unless the United States, Russia, and other powers find a way to agree on reining in their modernization programs, the world’s non-nuclear countries will have increasingly legitimate reasons to ask how they benefit from being part of the NPT — and why they shouldn’t go their own way.”
Via Foreign Policy / by John Mecklin
DISARM (?) AND MODERNIZE
Massive weapons upgrades now underway challenge the entire disarmament regime
“In terms of warhead numbers, the nuclear arms race may be over. But massive weapons upgrades now underway challenge the entire disarmament regime.”
The early decades of the Cold War, NATO made arrangements to bury what were known as atomic demolition munitions (in essence, nuclear mines) at key points in West Germany, to be detonated if Warsaw Pact forces ever invaded. Although this plan, if enacted, might have slowed the enemy advance, it also almost certainly would have turned vast West German territories into radioactive wastelands littered with corpses and smoldering buildings—the stuff of hellish alternative- history scenarios. The West viewed such tactical nukes—NATO fielded 7,000 to 8,000 of these shorter- range, smaller-yield weapons for most of the Cold War—as tripwires in anticipation of the Soviet Union’s own Strangelovian plans for its thousands of tactical weapons. That is to say, the forward positioning of these nukes was a signal: If the Soviet Union invaded Europe, confrontation would escalate quickly to the nuclear realm, and the United States would intervene.
With the end of the Cold War and the reduced risk of a Russian invasion, NATO eliminated almost all its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Today, five NATO countries—Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey—are widely believed to host roughly 200 U.S.-owned nuclear bombs at their air bases. These weapons, variants of the B61 warhead, a stalwart of the American thermonuclear arsenal since the late 1960s, are viewed by some security experts as provocative anachronisms. The critics argue that strategic missiles and bombers posted in the United States and the United Kingdom, along with missiles on nuclear submarines, provide more than enough deterrence against any Russian aggression.
But in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine, the controversy about B61s is being heightened and compounded. In addition to retaining tactical nukes in Europe, the United States plans to modernize the weapons, as well as its arsenal back home, in a remarkably expensive way. This decision has inflamed debate about the depth of the U.S. commitment to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which allows the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France to have nuclear weapons if they promise to eventually disarm.
Today, weapons innovation threatens to become the new mode for arms competition. Washington’s upgrading of the B61-4 bomb, for example, would equip the device with a tail assembly, making it into a precision-guided standoff weapon. An irony is attached to this redesigned device, called the B61-12: It would be able to attack the same targets as previous gravity bombs in the U.S. arsenal, but would do so more accurately and efficiently, using smaller yields that would create less collateral damage and less radioactive fallout. This means the bombs might be seen as more conceivably usable in a limited or tactical conflict. And this is precisely why the U.S. Congress rejected the Air Force’s requests for low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons in the 1990s: Their very accuracy increases the temptation to use them.
Nonetheless, under current plans, approximately 480 B61-12s are set to be produced by the mid-2020s, and they would serve all U.S. gravity-bomb missions contemplated for five different aircraft. In addition to deployment in Europe, the U.S. Air Force also intends to use the B61-12 to arm heavy B-2 and B-52 bombers based in America. Even by the standards of defense budgets, the B61 modernization program is exorbitant: Estimates place its ultimate cost north of $10 billion, or more than if the bombs were constructed of solid gold.
But the high cost and questionable utility of the B61 program are not anomalies—nor is the fact that the plan has received little publicity.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
- Public Interest Nonproliferation Groups Despair
Via Reaching Critical Will
2015 NPT Review Conference Briefing Book http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2015/2015-npt-briefing-book.pdf
The 2010 Action Plan is the latest in a series of agreements reached by NPT states parties over the past decades, including the 1995 principles and objectives, the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and the 13 practical steps from 2000. None of these agreements have yet been fully implemented. Article VI of the NPT, requiring nuclear disarmament, remains unfulfilled, even as the Treaty’s non-proliferation requirements are met and strengthened. The 64 actions of the Action Plan contain provisions on nuclear disarmament (22 actions), nuclear non-proliferation (23 actions), and nuclear energy (18 actions)…
Differing views on the timeframe within which the implementation of the Action Plan should be completed have emerged.
In the lead up to the 2015 Review Conference, some states parties stress that the 2010 Action Plan should be seen as a longterm roadmap. But most states parties do not agree with this retrogressive approach and still see it as a short-term plan that was intended to move states parties closer to full implementation of all Treaty provisions over a specified time frame. Failure to implement those actions within this time frame does not justify their indefinite extension, but rather, should serve as a catalyst for developing new approaches and initiatives to achieve the Treaty’s objectives. Current situation Implementation of actions across the three pillars varies greatly, therefore it cannot be considered adequately implemented. According to our 2015 NPT Action Plan Monitoring Report, only 28 out of the 64 actions can be considered fully implemented in 2015. 21 actions are being implemented to some degree and 15 actions cannot be considered implemented at all. Most progress has been achieved on the actions dealing with nuclear energy, while those on disarmament lag far behind.
○
Assuring Destruction / 2015 edition http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/9724-assuring-destruction-forever-2015-edition
This updated study explores the ongoing and planned nuclear weapon modernization programmes in China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
As of April 2015, the nuclear-armed states are estimated to possess approximately 15,650 nuclear weapons. All of them have plans to modernise — upgrade and / or extend the lives of—their nuclear weapons. In Assuring destruction forever: 2015 edition, non-governmental researchers and analysts provide information on each country’s modernisation plans.
○
US Nuclear Weapons Modernization http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/modernization/us-2015.pdf
The United States is conducting a complete overhaul of all components of its nuclear triad, requiring three full decades of investment. This will cost, including current operations, at least $1 trillion. The new weapons and factories placed into service will last, i.e. generate nuclear threats (their purpose), until late in this century. US nuclear modernisation is already producing significant new nuclear capabilities with unknowable consequences, and significant additional new capabilities are planned and budgeted. No warhead retirements are occurring under New START and none are committed. Future dismantlements have been made contingent on construction of new factories and deployment of new weapons. The modernisation programme-of-record has been dogged by delays, cancellations, downscaling, and cost overruns; its completion in an era of budgetary uncertainty and constraint is widely questioned. Modernisation competes with warhead dismantlement for scarce physical and financial resources in the production complex. There are deep concerns in government (including the military) and in civil society about nuclear weapons cost and relevance, but so far not one member of Congress publicly opposes maintaining a policy of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) based on a triad of delivery systems with thousands of nuclear warheads.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Nuclear NPT Review Conference
News:
Opening day speakers
Non-Aligned Movement – Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister Iran, Full Text of Opening Statement http://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/04/27/full-text-of-zarifs-statement-on-behalf-of-nam-to-the-npt-review-conference/
Kerry says Iran, World Powers Closer than Ever to a Historic Nuclear Deal / Reuters http://news.yahoo.com/kerry-irans-zarif-meet-un-anti-nuclear-arms-051054375.html
Kerry: Closer Than Ever to Historic Iran Deal / Al Arabiya-Reuters http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/04/28/Kerry-Iran-world-powers-closer-than-ever-to-historic-deal.html
“Quotable Quotes” from the NPT Conference / China News http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/28/c_134189543.htm
○
Putin: Russia Cuts Nuclear Arms Stockpiles to Minimal Level / Interfax http://rbth.co.uk/news/2015/04/28/russia_cuts_nuclear_arms_stockpiles_to_minimal_levels_-_putin_45598.html
New Technologies Complicate U.S.-Russia-China Arms Control http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15635/new-technologies-complicate-u-s-russia-china-arms-control
○
Press/Wire Service Reports:
Iran aims to use NPT conference to renew international pressure on Israel / Jerusalem to attend non-proliferation meet for first time in 20 years; Iran FM at opening of conference: ‘Israel is the single [worst] violator of this international regime [the NPT]’ / Haaretz http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.653836
After failing to preempt: Israel, Iran and nuclear war / Jerusalem Post http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/After-failing-to-preempt-Israel-Iran-and-nuclear-war-399373
○
Nuke-armed states not eliminating stockpiles: Iran http://www.ptinews.com/news/5967850_Nuke-armed-states-not-eliminating-stockpiles--Iran-.html
Nuclear disarmament NAM’s highest priority: Zarif http://en.mehrnews.com/detail/News/106889
NEW YORK, Apr. 28 (MNA) – Highlighting the nuclear disarmament, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Jvad Zarif delivered a speech in 2015 NPT Review Conference and deemed nuclear weapons the greatest threat to humanity.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Analysis/Opinion/Social Media:
Speakers List at the 2015 NPT Review Conference
○
US State Department Statements/Positions re: NPT Review Conference
Rough Seas Ahead: Issues for the 2015 NPT Review Conference
Armes Nucleaires – Review and Proposals
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICAN 424 NGOs 95 countries – NPT RevCon Briefing Materials – Nuclear Weapons by Country
Review of 2010 Final Document of NPT RevCon and Challenges to 2015 Conference
Review of 2010 and Obama/US NPT initiatives / India perspective
○
ian bremmer @ianbremmer Geopolitics in 3 Steps
Cold War: Stable, Dangerous Post-Cold War: Unstable, Not So Dangerous G-Zero: Unstable, Dangerous
○
Nuclear Weapon System Modernization, New Multilateral Era
New Technologies Complicate U.S.-Russia-China Arms Control http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15635/new-technologies-complicate-u-s-russia-china-arms-control
Is China Preparing MIRVed Ballistic Missiles?
China’s Nuclear Weapons Modernization
China Moving to Assured Retaliation
No longer a No “First Strike” Policy? China’s Defense Policy?
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/
Russia and America Stumbling to War / May-June 2015
Most dangerous are disagreements over the international system and the prerogatives of major powers in their immediate neighborhoods—disputes of the sort that have historically produced the greatest conflicts. And these are at the core of U.S. and Western tensions with Russia and, even more ominously, with China.
○
US Gears Up for Potential War in Space / April 2015
Air Force Space Command Commander Gen. John Hyten said during a press conference, “We have a responsibility to defend against all threats. That’s what our job is. … There is no doubt we have seen threats appear in the last decade, and we have to be prepared to respond to those threats. It’s that simple.”
China’s anti-satellite capabilities, tested and demonstrated. According to Gen. William Shelton, Commander of the US Air Force Space Command, US early warning satellites are at risk, most critical are satellites providing the US Army with survivable communications and missile (launch) warning.
Decapitation: Command and Control
○
Nuclear Weapons, Announced Stockpile, 2015-16
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
April 28, 2015 — Kerry says Iran, world powers “closer than ever” to historic nuclear deal / Voice of America (VOA) news report
Transcript / Secretary Kerry's speech, April 2015
UNITED NATIONS – The United States and five other major powers are closer than ever to a deal with Iran that would end a 12-year-old standoff over Tehran’s nuclear program, though more tough negotiations lie ahead, Secretary of State John Kerry said on Monday.
Kerry spoke at the United Nations on the opening day of a month-long conference taking stock of the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and ahead of a meeting in New York with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, their first face-to-face encounter since recent marathon talks in Lausanne, Switzerland.
○