

happy. Even those who see it as a holy crusade against the forces of evil bitterly resent our failure to unleash maximum force in support of it. Those who see the war in a different light, as a mistaken and immoral action in support of outmoded policies, are equally resentful. And the large majority, who normally accept with little question any military involvement, are restless and unhappy that our great effort is so difficult to rationalize and so indefinite in its outcome.

Those most directly concerned by the war—the youth whose lives are managed by the draft and may be forfeit to the war—have been motivated to attain a degree of activism to which our society is unaccustomed. This activism has spread, of its own dynamic, to questioning many other institutions of our society which they see with increasing clearness as part of a system which encourages and supports war. Not the least of these institutions which they question is the one with which they are most involved, the institutions of learning.

Activists from the black and brown communities, both young and old, have likewise seized upon the war as a convenient target. For a few it has been a target because of the policies it represents—for most because it represents a diversion of interest and resources from the cause which they consider greater, creating a just society within our own land.

Aside from those direct impingements on segments of the population, the war is also a major factor in stimulating inflation, creating an adverse balance of trade, accelerating our gold outflow, alienating many of our allies, and reducing our capacity to deal with other potential trouble spots around the world. For all of these reasons, a President of reasonable political acumen, if he can do so, will at a minimum reduce our in-

volvement in Vietnam to "acceptable" levels.

This in itself would do much to reduce our national discontent, and might even be sufficient to insure the political survival of the President for a second term. But it would not solve the underlying problems.

The basic situation represented by Vietnam is nothing less than how well we see the reality of those forces moving humanity today and how these forces can be influenced. If this Nation persists in seeing reality as the inevitability of conflict between "good" and "evil," with "good" residing in the so-called free capitalist—or semi-capitalist—nations and "evil" residing in the so-called slave Communist—or semi-Communist—nations, then we have solved no problems. If we see our role in the world as the knight in shining armor riding to the rescue of every fair damsel threatened by the dragon of communism, we have solved no problems. Or, in more modern terms, if we see ourselves as the powerful and paternalistic policeman of the world, obligated by our strength and the justice of our cause, to intervene on the side of righteousness in every conflict, then we have solved no problems. We have merely postponed for a day the results of our folly.

To solve the problem represented by our involvement in Vietnam requires that we adopt, and as quickly as possible, a different world view, and with that view a correspondingly different set of policies in our relations with the rest of the world. This new view must encompass a large and unaccustomed measure of national humility, restraint, and realism in seeking to enforce our will around the world. As a nation we are 6 percent of humanity. That is the true and lasting measures of the influence we have and should seek. The fact that we have the